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Interstate air pollution can prevent even the most diligent downwind state
from attaining the air quality levels required by federal law. Allocating responsi-
bility for emissions cuts when multiple upwind states contribute to downwind air
quality violations presents a particularly difficult problem. Justice Ginsburg’s
opinion for the Court in EPA v. EME Homer City Generator, L.P., gives
EPA broad discretion to craft regulatory solutions for this problem. Although the
specific statutory provision at issue was deceptively simple, the underlying problem
was especially complex because of the large number of states involved. Indeed,
neither the majority opinion nor the dissent seems to have fully grasped how
allocation would work even in some of the simplified numerical examples dis-
cussed by the justices.
Although the specific question before the Court is now settled, the Court’s
holding has continuing ramifications. It will shape further development of EPA’s
ongoing efforts to deal with interstate pollution, but it also has broader implica-
tions for the role of cost under federal pollution laws. In addition, the decision
may have significant implications regarding EPA’s flexibility in mandating state
plans to reduce carbon emissions under sections 111(d) and 115 of the Clean Air
Act.
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INTRODUCTION
EPA v. EME Homer City Generator, L.P.,1 involved the complex issue of
interstate air pollution, which can make it impossible for even the most
diligent downwind state to attain the air quality levels required by federal
law. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the D.C. Cir-
cuit had wrestled with this problem for more than a decade before the issue
reached the Supreme Court. In the end, they had reached a stalemate, with
the D.C. Circuit insisting on an allocation scheme that EPA insisted was
unworkable. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court gives EPA broad dis-
cretion to craft regulatory solutions for this problem. Despite a vigorous
dissent from Justice Scalia, the Court found ample room in the statutory
language for EPA’s flexible, cost-based approach to the problem.
Quite apart from its doctrinal significance, the Court’s decision also had
large practical effects. EPA estimated that the rule would save between
13,000 and 34,000 lives per year and have other health benefits like prevent-
ing 15,000 non-fatal heart attacks.2 The cost-benefit analysis for the rule
was strongly positive, with benefits outweighing costs by somewhere be-
tween a ratio of 50:1 and 117:1.3 EPA projects that the rule “will reduce
1. EPA v. EME Homer City Generator, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014). The EME
Homer facility was a major source of interstate air pollution in its own right:
For more than 40 years, Homer City has spewed sulfur dioxide from two of its
three units completely unchecked, and still does because it is largely exempt from
federal air pollution laws passed years after it was built in 1969. Last year, the
facility released 114,245 tons of sulfur dioxide, more than all of the power plants in
neighboring New York combined. ‘It is an emblem, a poster child of the challenge
of interstate air pollution,’ said Lem Srolovic, the head of the environmental pro-
tection bureau for the New York Attorney General’s office, in an interview with
The Associated Press.
Dina Cappielo & Kevin Befos, After Decades, Dirty Power Plant to Get Clean, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(May 27, 2014 4:38 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/after-decades-dirty-power-plant-get-
clean. As the title of that article indicates, the plant was finally planning to install scrubbers,
one of the last plants in the country to do so. Id.
2. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR), http://www.epa.gov/air
transport/CSAPR/ (last updated Nov. 21, 2014).
3. Id.
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power plant SO2 emissions by seventy-three percent and NOX emissions by
fifty-four percent from 2005 levels” in the affected area.4
The key problem confronting EPA was how to allocate the burden of
emissions reduction among upstream states. To make a rough analogy, re-
quiring the states to contribute to making the necessary pollution reduc-
tions is like requiring families to contribute to the cost of a picnic. Should
the families divide the cost evenly, or should we take into account their
ability to pay? Should the division be in proportion to the relative sizes of
the families? Should we take into account that one family has small children
who will eat less? The problem of dividing emission cuts between two states
poses a similar problem. EPA decided that the states’ emission budgets
should be based on economic feasibility, whereas the challengers of the reg-
ulations argued that only the physical aspects of the situation could be
considered.
The EME Homer case presented the Court with considerable difficul-
ties. The Clean Air Act requires that states prevent sources from contribut-
ing significantly to downwind air quality violations,5 but the statute does
not specifically address how the responsibility to reduce emissions should be
allocated when multiple states are contributing to downwind air quality vio-
lations. The Court had a good deal of difficulty in analyzing the allocation
problem. Indeed, as we will see, neither the majority nor the dissent seems
to have fully grasped how allocation would work even in stylized numerical
examples. This Article will use a series of diagrams that provides much
greater clarity and reveals some problematic assertions in the opinions.
Emissions sources will change over time and air quality standards them-
selves are not static. The Supreme Court’s holding will continue to shape
these continuing efforts. However, the Court’s opinion also has broader im-
plications. A key question before the Court was whether EPA could con-
sider the cost of cutting emissions in determining the responsibilities of
upwind states. The general question of when EPA can consider cost has
reached the Supreme Court on several occasions, and EME Homer may help
clarify the doctrine in this area. The Court’s opinion may also have signifi-
cant implications regarding EPA’s efforts to address climate change. It pro-
vides some indications of how the Court is likely to view EPA’s flexibility
in mandating state plans to reduce carbon emissions under the Clean Air
Act.
In addition to exploring these broader implications of the opinion, this
Article seeks to sort out the confusing issues surrounding interstate alloca-
tion and to assess the Court’s analysis of the problem. Part I of the Article
4. Id.
5. Clean Air Act of 1963 (CAA) § 110(2)(D)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i).
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fills in the background to the Court’s decision. It explains the statutory
framework, the problem of allocating emissions cuts among polluters, and
the D.C. Circuit’s somewhat tortuous efforts to interpret the relevant stat-
ute. In the end, the D.C. Circuit had rejected root and branch the efforts of
both the Bush Administration and the Obama Administration to address
regulatory pollution. Instead, the court held, EPA was required to ignore
cost considerations completely and to allocate emission cuts among upwind
states almost entirely on the basis of their physical contributions to down-
wind violations.
Part II considers one of the key issues in EME Homer: whether the
statute mandates that cuts be distributed in proportion to the downwind
pollution attributable to a state. The D.C. Circuit believed that the plain
language of the statute mandated a proportionality standard, and Justice
Scalia excoriated the majority for reading the statute otherwise. Part II con-
cludes that the Court was correct to reject that view, although some of the
dissent’s arguments were stronger than the majority may have realized. The
workability of a proportionality approach was vigorously contested on both
sides, but the justices took very different views of how the approach would
apply in concrete situations. The diagrammatic method adopted in this Ar-
ticle greatly clarifies this problem and shows that both sides were to some
extent confused in their analysis.
Part III examines whether EPA could consider the cost of pollution
reductions in the allocation process, even though the relevant provision
does not allude to costs. The Supreme Court has confronted the role of cost
in environmental statutes on several occasions, with conflicting conclusions
about whether EPA had discretion to consider costs. The majority agreed
with EPA that it was reasonable to consider cost in the context of interstate
air pollution. Once again, the Article sides with the majority, although
neither the majority nor the dissent provided a satisfactory analysis of prior
precedent. Indeed, neither side mentioned the most recent opinion to ad-
dress the issue.
The Article then offers some concluding thoughts. If this Article does
nothing else, it should persuade readers of the complexity of the problem
facing EPA in implementing the statute and the difficulty that the judges
have faced in assessing these efforts. It is commonplace to refer airily to
agency expertise as a reason for deference, but EME Homer brings home in
a concrete way the agency’s comparative advantage in addressing complex
issues of statutory implementation. Justice Ginsburg was entirely right to
emphasize this point in her majority opinion. Her opinion for the Court
also has broader implications regarding the general role of cost in imple-
menting environmental statutes. In particular, it has much to offer as a
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source of guidance regarding EPA’s discretion to devise sensible approaches
to the biggest environmental problem of our era, global climate change.
Although the necessarily technical aspects of the opinion may be off-putting
to readers, it deserves recognition as a landmark decision in environmental
law and administrative law more broadly.
I. CROSS-BOUNDARY POLLUTION, THE ALLOCATION PROBLEM,
AND THE D.C. CIRCUIT
This Part provides some of the background needed to understand the
issues before the Court in EME Homer, beginning with a description of the
relevant statutory provisions and a brief explanation of how similar issues
are handled in other legal settings. The problem of allocating responsibility
for harmful effects among multiple actors is not unique to interstate air
pollution, and a consideration of how the law has addressed similar issues
helps provide perspective. This Part then introduces a graphical presenta-
tion of the emissions allocation problem before turning to a discussion of
earlier D.C. Circuit decisions that set the stage for the Court’s ruling. The
earlier interactions between the court of appeals and EPA help explain the
shape of the regulation before the Court as well as the reasons why imple-
menting the statute had proved so difficult.
A. Cross-Boundary Pollution and the Clean Air Act
Understanding EME Homer requires, first of all, grasping the basic
framework of the Clean Air Act’s regulation of stationary sources (i.e., not
cars, planes, or trains). Section 109 of the Clean Air Act directs EPA to
establish national ambient air quality standards (NAAQSs) for pollutants
that endanger public health or welfare.6 Each pollutant is subject to two
types of air quality standards: primary standards that, “allowing an adequate
margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health”;7 and secondary
standards “to protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated ad-
verse effects . . . .”8 Each state is required by section 110(a)(1)9 to submit to
EPA a plan to implement that standard within its boundaries.10 EPA, in
turn, is required to approve a state implementation plan (SIP) if it had been
adopted after public hearings and satisfied the conditions specified in sec-
6. CAA § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409.
7. CAA § 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).
8. CAA § 109(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2).
9. CAA § 110(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1).
10. Section 110(a) provides that each state shall adopt “a plan which provides for imple-
mentation, maintenance, and enforcement” of the primary (health-based) and of the secon-
dary (welfare based) air quality standards. CAA § 110(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1).
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tion 110(a)(2).11 A SIP must include “emission limitations, schedules, and
timetables for compliance with such limitations,”12 as well as assurances of
appropriate resources to enforce the plan.13 If EPA determines that the
state’s plan is not sufficient to attain primary air standards on schedule or to
attain secondary NAAQSs within a reasonable time, it must issue a federal
implementation plan that will assure timely attainment.14 Once EPA ap-
proves a state plan, it is enforceable not only as state law but also as federal
law under section 113.15
Thus, the core of the statute is the issuance of state-by-state plans to
achieve attainment of national air quality standards within each state.16 This
core mechanism, however, makes no provision for the all-too-real possibility
that emissions in one state will have a significant impact on air quality in
another state. The statute provides three ancillary mechanisms for dealing
with such cross-boundary emissions.
The most important mechanism is the “good neighbor” provision found
in section 110(a)(2)(D)(i). The good neighbor provision requires each SIP
to do as follows:
(D) contain adequate provisions (i) prohibiting, consistent with the
provisions of this subchapter, any source or other type of emissions
activity within the State from emitting any air pollutant in amounts
which will . . . contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or in-
terfere with maintenance by, any other State with respect to any
such national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard.17
In other words, each state has to prevent any source within its borders from
“contributing significantly” to nonattainment in any other state.
11. CAA § 110(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2); Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60 (1975)
(making it clear that these are the sole requirements for approval).
12. CAA § 110(a)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A).
13. CAA § 110(a)(2)(E), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E).
14. CAA § 110(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c).
15. CAA § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 7413.
16. Although this is the core of the statute, the Clean Air Act is replete with other
provisions governing a variety of issues ranging from smokestack heights (CAA § 123) to
non-attainment (CAA §§ 201-214a) to acid rain (§§ 351-351o), and a host of others. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 7423, 7501-7514a, 7651-7651o; for an overview of the statute and its history, see
DANIEL A. FARBER & ANN CARLSON, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 420-32 (9th ed.
2014).
17. CAA § 110(a)(2)(D)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i). The provision also applies to
emissions that interfere with maintenance of air quality standards once the standards have
been attained, as opposed to preventing attainment of the standards in the first place. The
only difference is that the word “significantly” is omitted in the case of maintaining existing
standards. For simplicity, this Article will focus exclusively on potential interference with
maintenance as opposed to attainment, but the same arguments apply to both.
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The good neighbor provision interlocks with section 126, which em-
powers states to petition EPA for a finding that stationary sources in other
states are violating the good neighbor provision.18 Once EPA has made such
a finding, it becomes unlawful for sources to violate the good neighbor pro-
vision even if they are not violating their own permits.19 Each state’s imple-
mentation plan must ensure compliance with the requirements of section
126.20
In implementing these rules, EPA can establish an air transport region
of states receiving or emitting significant pollutants.21 Representatives of
these states form a transport commission, which has the responsibility of
assessing possible mitigation strategies and making recommendations to
EPA on how to implement the good neighbor provision.22 Moreover, the
commission can request that EPA issue a finding that states are violating
the good neighbor provision, and EPA must make a finding about the exis-
tence of such violations within eighteen months; the finding is then subject
to judicial review as a final agency action.23
These provisions cohere around a key mandate: sources in one state
may not “contribute significantly to nonattainment” in another state. How-
ever, the situation becomes more complicated if more than one upwind
source is involved (and even more so if more than one downwind state is
impacted). For example, suppose that State 1 is out of attainment. Neither
upwind State A nor upwind State B is adding enough pollution indepen-
dently to cause the nonattainment, but their joint pollution does so. Thus,
neither state is the “but for” cause of the nonattainment. State 1 could attain
the air quality standards if either one of the upwind states stopped polluting
its air, if they both cut their pollution proportionately, or if they adopted
18. CAA § 126(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b). Sections 126(b) provides: “Any State or polit-
ical subdivision may petition the Administrator for a finding that any major source or group
of stationary sources emits or would emit any air pollutant in violation of the [good neighbor
provision].” The relationship between § 126 and § 110 gave rise to some perplexities, in part
because of a typographical error in § 126, as discussed in Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249
F.3d 1032, 1041 (2001). EPA’s initial reluctance to implement § 126 is illustrated by State of
Connecticut v. U.S. EPA, 656 F.2d 902 (1981).
19. CAA § 126(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7426(c). Subsection (c) makes it a violation of § 126
and of the state implementation plan for any major source to continue to operate in violation
of the good neighbor provision after a finding has been made. Thus, unlike the good neigh-
bor provision of § 110, § 126 operates directly against major sources rather than mandating
that states amend their implementation plans to deal with the problem.
20. CAA § 110(a)(2)(D)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(ii).
21. CAA § 176a(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7506a(a).
22. CAA § 176a(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7506a(b); for a discussion of how EPA has helped
catalyze regional efforts to deal with interstate pollution, see Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Feder-
alism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1144-50 (2009).
23. CAA § 176a(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7506a(c).
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other cuts equaling the needed joint reduction. In principle, any one of
these measures would eliminate any violation of the good neighbor provi-
sion or section 126.
The good neighbor provision of the Clean Air Act is by no means the
only situation in which it is necessary to allocate responsibility among mul-
tiple contributors for a harmful outcome. Rather, allocation of responsibility
for harm among multiple parties is a recurring legal problem. To put the
problem in context, it is helpful to consider how the law addresses such
situations in other areas.
An analogous situation is presented by ordinary tort law. Suppose a
downwind state managed to establish tort liability for several upwind states
for harming it. How would damages be allocated among the upwind states?
The Restatement (Third) of Torts specifies two key factors: “the nature of
the person’s risk-creating conduct” and the “strength of the causal connec-
tion between the person’s risk-creating conduct and the harm.”24 The
causal-connection factor seems analogous to the proportion of emissions
from various upwind states. The other factor is assessed on the basis of
“how unreasonable the conduct was under the circumstances, the extent to
which the conduct failed to meet the applicable legal standard, the circum-
stances surrounding the conduct, each person’s abilities and disabilities, and
each person’s awareness, intent, or indifference with respect to the risks.”25
In allowing EPA to consider how easily an upwind state could have reduced
its emissions, EME Homer seems consistent with the Restatement’s focus on
the reasonableness of the harm-causing conduct.
An even closer analogy is presented by the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).26 At issue
is how to allocate clean-up costs for hazardous waste among the responsible
parties, such as the generator(s) of the waste and the owner(s) of the site.
Section 113(f)(1) of CERCLA provides that “[i]n resolving contribution
claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such
equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate.”27 As the Second
Circuit explained in an early case involving municipal waste:
An array of equitable factors may be considered in this allocation
process, including the relative volume and toxicity of the sub-
stances. . . , the relative cleanup costs incurred as a result of these
wastes, the degree of care exercised by each party with respect to
24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 8 (2000).
25. Id. at cmt. c.
26. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CER-
CLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006).
27. CERCLA 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).
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the hazardous substances, and the financial resources of the parties
involved.28
The court added that,
Consequently, the amount of liability imposed will not necessarily
be a function solely of the total volume of municipal waste disposed
of in the landfills, but rather will be a function of the extent to
which municipal dumping of hazardous substances both engen-
dered the necessity and contributed to the costs, of cleanup.29
Courts often rely on the so-called Gore factors, which include the defen-
dant’s degree of care during disposal and cooperation with authorities dur-
ing the cleanup.30
As another court pointed out just three years after CERCLA’s enact-
ment (and before section 113(f) was added to the statute),31 the statute “on
its face, gives no guidance on how to solve the problem of comingling, or
whether liability should be apportioned based on the volume or toxicity of
the waste, or how liability is to be apportioned between owners, operators,
transporters and generators;” the statute’s “silence in light of these ex-
tremely complex issues persuades the Court that Congress intended the
courts to enforce CERCLA by applying evolving principles of common law
on a case by case basis.”32 The addition of section 113(f) validated the ap-
proach taken by the courts, but its vague reference to equitable factors pro-
vided little additional guidance.
As the torts and CERCLA approaches indicate, determining how to
allocate responsibility is far from a straightforward problem. Any reader of
EME Homer is likely to agree after reviewing some of the numerical exam-
ples provided in the majority opinion and dissent.33 Indeed, the courts
themselves sometimes seem to find their own numerical examples confus-
ing.34 In the next Section, we will use some simple diagrams to show that
more complicated issues arise when there are multiple upwind and down-
28. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1206 (2nd Cir. 1992).
29. Id.
30. FARBER & CARLSON, supra note 16, at 852-53. For a case relying on the Gore Factors
in applying § 113(f), see, e.g., Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930 (8th Cir.
1995).
31. The contribution provision was added in 1986. See FARBER & CARLSON, supra note 16,
at 856.
32. United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1255 (S.D. Ill. 1984).
33. EPA v. EME Homer City Generator, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014).
34. For discussion of instances where the judges seem to have been confused in their
analysis of numerical examples, see text accompanying notes 84-86 and 88-92, infra.
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wind states.35 Diagrams of this kind will greatly clarify our later analysis of
the issues before the Court.
B. The Nature of the Allocation Problem
We will focus in this section on a simple situation: two downwind states
(State 1 and State 2) are impacted by pollution from two upwind states
(State A and State B). We will analyze what combinations of cuts from the
upwind states will suffice to bring the downwind states into attainment. In
the simplest scenario, the downwind states would be just barely complying
were it not for the upwind states. Under those circumstances, the only solu-
tion is for each upwind state to reduce its pollution to the level that assures
that no significant amount of pollution is reaching the downwind states.
In another scenario, the downwind states might be contributing rela-
tively little to their own pollution problems, leaving headroom between
their self-generated pollution and the amount needed to attain the national
air quality standards. We might assume in this example that, without
outside pollution, State 1’s air would have three units of pollution, the air
quality standard would be five units, and the current level due to “imported”
pollution is seven units. Thus, States A and B are jointly contributing four
units, but we need to cut only two units. The question then is how to divide
the two units of cuts between States A and B.
To complicate matters, assume a similar situation is present in down-
wind State 2, but the proportions of pollution the upwind state contributes
to each downwind State vary. For instance, upwind State A may be very
close to State 1, whereas upwind State B is far away, so changes in emissions
in State A may have a higher impact on air quality in State 1. On the other
hand, despite being farther away, State B may produce much greater emis-
sions, outweighing the proximity factor in terms of impacts on downwind
State 1.
This already confusing situation is highly oversimplified. It ignores the
difficult modeling problems involved in determining how emission changes
in upwind states affect air quality in downwind states. Moreover, trans-
boundary air pollution can involve far more than two upwind states and two
downwind states. However, the two-on-two situation provides clear insights
35. Another complication we will ignore is that many states are downwind from some
states and upwind from others. See Reply Brief for the Federal Petitioners at 18, U.S. EPA v.
EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014) (Nos. 12-1182 and 12-1183).
This can cause serious complications. If such a state is required to reduce its emissions to
assist attainment in a state downwind from it, it will have less of a nonattainment problem
itself. As a result, states that are upwind of the state in question could adjust their emissions
upward. But that change in turn might affect air quality levels in the state furthest down-
wind, requiring the “middle” state to cut its own emissions further.
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into the nature of the more complex real-world problems and can be graphi-
cally portrayed in two-dimensional diagrams.
Figures 1 and 2 show two variations on this scenario. The lines labeled
State 1 and State 2 show the mix of controls needed to bring both down-
wind states into attainment by reducing emissions in upwind States A and
B. The axes measure emissions reductions from the status quo by figures
between zero and one hundred percent. If one state does less, the other
state must do more to achieve attainment in the downwind state.36 The tilt
between the two lines depends on the total amount of pollution emitted in
each state and the proportion of that pollution reaching each of the two
downwind states. A nearly horizontal line would mean that emissions reduc-
tions in State B (the x-axis) have relatively little effect on pollution levels
downwind compared with reductions in State A (the y-axis). Note that pol-
lution levels in downwind states are lowest at the origin—where all emis-
sions are eliminated—and highest in the upper right corner of the graph,
which represents the status quo.37
FIGURE 1. STATES WITH NON-INTERSECTING COMPLIANCE CURVES
36. Note that the compliance lines do not hit either axis; this is because the statute
prohibits only “significant” impacts on downwind states, so states escape regulation when
their emissions fall to a sufficiently low level. See CAA § 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I), 42 U.S.C.
7410(a)(2)((d)(i)(I) (states must ensure that no source significantly contributes to downwind
nonattainment).
37. For simplicity, we will assume throughout that completely eliminating upwind
emissions would bring the downwind states into compliance. This assumes that the down-
wind states are making whatever cuts in their own emissions are appropriate, and that emis-
sions from natural sources or from outside the United States are not themselves sufficient to
cause nonattainment.
224 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 4:2
FIGURE 2. STATES WITH UNIQUE COMPLIANCE MIX
The difference between Figures 1 and 2 results from varying relative
contributions of the two upwind sources as compared to the two downwind
sources. As we will see, it matters whether the relative impacts of the two
upwind sources are similar for both downwind states, or whether the share
of relative responsibility between upwind states shifts substantially in one
downwind state versus the other. One thing to note about these diagrams is
that they say nothing about cost. We can assume that greater emissions cuts
in any one state cost more than smaller ones, but we do not know how much
more, nor do we know how costs might compare between the two states.
Cutting emissions may also have benefits in the upwind states, and we are
ignoring those as well.
In Figure 1, the relative impacts of the two upwind states are roughly
similar with regard to both downwind states, but one of the downwind
states (State 2) requires more extensive pollution reductions by the upwind
states to bring it into compliance. Essentially, greater combined emissions
cuts are required from States A and B for State 2 to reach compliance than
for State 1. As the diagram shows, it is possible to achieve attainment in
State 2 only by “over-controlling” and cutting pollution in State 1 below the
level required to meet the air quality standards there. There is simply no
way to satisfy the precise statutory standard for air quality in both states; in
order to hit the target for State 2, over-control in State 1 is necessary. Thus,
in order to bring State 2 into compliance, air pollution in State 1 must be
cut more than is otherwise necessary to achieve the required air quality
there.
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Under some circumstances, however, it may be possible to bring two
states precisely into attainment, without over-controlling. This situation is
illustrated in Figure 2. In contrast to Figure 1, the two attainment lines
cross in Figure 2, meaning there is a unique set of upwind pollution reduc-
tions that will precisely bring the two downwind states into compliance.
That combination of pollution reductions is represented by Point X. State B
would be required to cut its emissions by about one-half, while State A
would have to cut its emissions by about eighty percent. However, this is
not the only way to ensure that air quality standards are met in both states.
Any point on the upper line to the right of the crossover point will also
create attainment in both downwind states (though State 2 will have even
better air quality than required by the air quality standards).
C. Initial Regulatory Efforts and the D.C. Circuit
With this understanding of the problem of interstate pollution in mind,
we turn to the regulatory effort to deal with cross-state pollution. Imple-
mentation of the good neighbor provision proved challenging both for EPA
and the courts. As we will see, the D.C. Circuit was initially supportive of
EPA’s efforts, but then became increasingly convinced that the statute pro-
vided a clear roadmap that left EPA little discretion.
Michigan v. EPA38 was the first of the three key opinions in the D.C.
Circuit dealing with the good neighbor provision. In 1990, Congress put the
good neighbor provision into its final form, changing it from a prohibition
on emissions that “prevent” attainment to a prohibition on emissions that
significantly contribute to nonattainment.39 EPA issued a regulation in
1998 mandating that twenty-two states and Washington, D.C. revise their
SIPs to comply with the good neighbor provision in order to limit ozone
pollution in downwind states.40 The regulation required that each jurisdic-
tion reduce nitric oxides (NOx) using “highly cost-effective controls” (i.e.,
controls costing $2000/ton or less).41
The most important issue before the court involved EPA’s use of cost as
a factor in calculating reductions. EPA had first made an initial determina-
tion of significance based on “magnitude, frequency, and relative amount” of
a state’s contribution to ozone pollution in each downwind state.42 Then,
EPA ruled that a state’s contribution would no longer be considered signifi-
38. 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
39. Id. at 674.
40. Id. at 669.
41. Id. at 675.
42. Id.
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cant if it implemented certain highly cost-effective controls.43 EPA’s goal,
in the court’s view, was to “have a lot of states make what it considered
modest NOx reductions, uniformly limited to ones that could be achieved
(in EPA’s estimate) for less than $2000 a ton.”44 Consequently, the amount
that counted as significant would “vary from state to state depending on
variations in cutback costs.”45 After some initial waffling on their position,
the states challenging the rule argued that the statute barred EPA from any
consideration of costs; indeed, they argued that “if faced with two states,
one of which could eliminate all relevant emissions at a trivial cost, while
the other could eliminate none at a cost of less than $5000 a ton, EPA must
mandate the same cutback for each.”46
The majority rejected this argument. It observed that “significant” is
often a multidimensional concept, as in the phrase “significant other.”47 Re-
lying on circuit precedent establishing a presumption in favor of EPA’s abil-
ity to consider costs in implementing the statute,48 the court concluded that
the states had not identified the required clear evidence of congressional
intent.49
In dissent, Judge Sentelle sided with the challengers.50 Focusing on the
statutory language requiring adequate measures to eliminate “any air pollu-
tant in amounts that will . . . contribute significantly to nonattainment,” he
argued that the significance determination had to be made purely on the
basis of physical characteristics—the amount of emissions or the significance
of the source’s contribution to downwind pollution.51 While Congress did
not define the meaning of “significant contribution,” he said, “neither EPA
nor the majority have offered any reasonable interpretation of those words
43. Id.
44. Id. Downwind states were making substantially greater investments to control their
own emissions. Reply Brief for the Federal Petitioners, supra note 35, at 21.
45. Michigan at 675.
46. Id. at 676.
47. Id. at 677. The regulation seems to have been quite successful:
To date, the NOx Budget Trading Program appears to have been extremely suc-
cessful. For the 2007 ozone season, NOx emissions were five percent below the
emission cap and overall, ground level ozone has fallen ten percent between 2002
and 2007. Ozone NOx emissions have declined in every participating state. This
decline has occurred despite an increase in overall heat input, which tracks total
power generation.
Carlson, supra note 22, at 1150.
48. That circuit precedent seems at odds with the later decision in Whitman v. Ameri-
can Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457 (2011) (rejecting the use of use of such a presumption in
determining the relevance of cost to determining air quality standards).
49. Michigan at 677-79.
50. Id. at 695 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
51. Id.
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which makes them depend upon or even relate to the cost effectiveness of
alleviation.”52 As we will see below, Judge Sentelle’s proportionality concept
resurfaced in the EME Homer litigation, gaining the support of a majority
on the D.C. Circuit and two dissenters at the Supreme Court.
The EPA regulation at issue in Michigan v. EPA also contained an emis-
sions trading option that states could adopt voluntarily.53 The court did not
rule on the legality of this option since none of the parties challenged it.54 It
would be only a few years, however, before the court found the opportunity
to rule on the compatibility of emissions trading with the good neighbor
provision in North Carolina v. EPA.55
EPA’s next effort to implement the good neighbor provision, the Bush
Administration’s Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), directly involved fine
particulates (PM2.5) and ozone, but imposed limits on SO2 and NOx as pre-
cursors of these pollutants.56 This time, EPA’s net swept in twenty-eight
states and the District of Columbia.57 EPA used a two-fold test of signifi-
cance, which was based purely on the amount of emissions for PM2.5 viola-
tions; for ozone, the test was based on the magnitude and frequency of the
contribution to violations and the size of the contribution relative to the
amount of excess ozone.58 States were again given the option of participat-
ing in a trading program or of facing fixed caps if they chose not to.59 The
caps were determined first by setting regional budgets, and then allocating
the budgets among states “according to each state’s proportion of oil-, gas-,
and coal-fired facilities.”60 Another complicated set of provisions not rele-
vant to our discussion attempted to coordinate SO2 controls with the sepa-
rate SO2 trading system meant to address acid rain.61
The D.C. Circuit struck down the rule. Regarding the trading system,
the court faulted EPA for addressing the cumulative effect of upwind emis-
sions, rather than matching emissions between emitting and receiving
states.62 The court pointed out that the “EPA’s apportionment decisions
have nothing to do with each state’s ‘significant contribution’ because under
EPA’s method of analysis, state budgets do not matter for significant contri-
52. Id. at 697.
53. Id. at 676.
54. Id.
55. North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
56. Id. at 903.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 904.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 903.
62. Id. at 908.
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bution purposes.”63 The trading system was invalid because it did not
“achieve[ ] something measurable toward” ensuring that no individual state’s
pollution significantly contributed to downwind non-attainment in any in-
dividual state.64 Thus, in the court’s view, EPA failed to consider the state-
by-state linkages and ensure that each upwind state would take at least a
“measurable” step toward reducing its downwind pollution.65 Indeed,
“[b]ecause CAIR is designed as a complete remedy” under the good neigh-
bor provision, “it must actually require elimination of emissions from
sources that contribute significantly and interfere with maintenance in
downwind nonattainment areas.”66
The court also rejected EPA’s method for setting NOx budgets, which
were designed to produce an “equitable balance of controls.”67 Combined
with the trading scheme, the net effect of EPA’s allocation was that coal-
reliant states would get excess allowances, which they could then sell to
firms in other states in order to fund their own emissions reductions.68 In
the court’s view, this contravened the statutory mandate to reduce emissions
“within the State” contributing to downwind pollution.69
After its loss in North Carolina, EPA went back to the drawing board
and tried again under a new presidential administration. The result was the
2011 Transport Rule (also called the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, or
CSAPR), which came before the D.C. Circuit in EME Homer City Genera-
tion L.P. v. EPA.70 The court had left the CAIR rule in place pending re-
placement by EPA,71 so, presumably, EPA was under less time pressure
than it would have been if interstate pollution had been left completely
unregulated.
This time, EPA used a two-stage process to set each state’s obligations.
First, it determined whether a state significantly contributed to a specific
downwind state’s nonattainment, with significance defined as being any-
63. Id. at 907.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 908. The word “maintenance” appears to be an error, because the court only
later discusses the “good neighbor” clause dealing with maintaining of attainment in the next
subsection of the opinion. Doubtless the court meant “attainment.”
67. Id. at 919.
68. Id. at 920-21.
69. Id. at 921.
70. EME Homer City Generation L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012); for
discussion of the Court of Appeals opinion, see Jeremy Feigenbaum, Becoming Good Neighbors
After EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 259 (2014). I
consider the Supreme Court phase of the litigation in the next subsection.
71. EME Homer, 696 F.3d at 15.
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thing over one percent of the relevant air quality standard.72 Then, at the
second stage, EPA used a cost-based standard to determine how much each
state could reduce its emissions at a given cost. After weighing both air
pollution impacts and economic impacts, the regulation set a $500/ton
threshold for ozone and NOx.73 As a result of this cost threshold, Florida,
for example, was required to make a disproportionate share of NOx cuts,
accounting for over 15,000 tons of the 19,000 “ozone-season” NOx emissions
in states under the $500/ton cap.74 Presumably, this was because Florida
had previously done little to control emissions compared to other states. For
SO2, EPA used the $500 cost cap for one group of states, but found that
applying that standard to another group of states would not result in suffi-
cient reductions to bring the downwind states into compliance.75 States in
the second group were therefore subject to a $2,300/ton cost cap instead.76
EPA then issued federal implementation plans based on these determina-
tions, which included an interstate trading provision.77
The Transport Rule was challenged in the D.C. Circuit, which struck
down the rule in a sweeping opinion by Judge Kavanaugh. His analysis
began by identifying two “red flags” that he distilled from prior opinions.
First, the statutory text limits EPA’s powers to the elimination of all but an
insignificant part of emissions that “travel beyond an upwind State’s borders
and end up in a downwind State’s nonattainment area.”78 Second, the sig-
nificance of the State’s contribution “depends on the relative contributions
of that upwind State, of other upwind State contributors, and of the down-
wind State.”79 Judge Kavanaugh drew the conclusion that “the collective
burden must be allocated among the upwind States in proportion to the size
of their contributions to the downwind State’s nonattainment.”80
72. Id.
73. Id. at 17.
74. Brief of Industry and Labor Respondents at 30 n.15, U.S. EPA v. EME Homer
City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014) (Nos. 12-1182 and 12-1183).
75. EME Homer, 696 F.3d at 17-18.
76. Id. at 18.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 20.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 21. Judge Kavanagh provided an example to show precisely how EPA was to
apply this rule:
Suppose the NAAQS is 100 units, but the downwind State’s nonattainment area
contains 150 units. Suppose further that the downwind State contributes 90 units,
and three upwind States contribute 20 units each. Because the upwind States are
responsible for the downwind State’s exceeding the NAAQS by 50 units, the
downwind State is entitled to at most 50 units of relief from the upwind States so
that the downwind State can achieve attainment of the NAAQS. Distributing
those obligations in a manner proportional to their contributions, each of the three
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This analysis seems in somewhat obvious tension with the holding in
Michigan v. EPA that cost can be a factor in determining the “significance”
of a state’s contribution. Judge Kavanaugh attempted to square the two
opinions by reading Michigan as allowing EPA to use cost only to lower a
state’s initial assignment of responsibility, but not to increase it.81
Judge Kavanaugh then added that “EPA must also ensure that the com-
bined obligations of the various upwind States, as aggregated, do not pro-
duce more than necessary ‘over-control’ in the downwind States—that is,
that the obligations do not go beyond what is necessary” to achieve down-
wind air quality standards.82 Judge Kavanaugh conceded, however, that
over-control sometimes may be required to ensure that the reductions bring
every downwind state into compliance. As Figure 1 demonstrates, Judge
Kavanaugh was correct on this score.
Judge Kavanaugh then held that the Transport Rule was flawed in three
respects. First, the obligations were not based on the “amount” of the state’s
contribution to downwind noncompliance, and if the state’s emissions re-
ductions were cheap, it could actually be required to reduce below the zone
of “insignificance” defined in the first step of EPA’s analysis.83 Second,
EPA failed to calculate reductions based on the proportion of each upwind
state’s contribution to nonattainment downwind.84 Third, EPA “failed to
ensure that the collective obligations of the various upwind States, when
aggregated, did not produce unnecessary over-control in the downwind
States.”85 Judge Rogers wrote a vigorous dissent, largely on the grounds
that these claims were not properly before the court.86
A consistent thread runs through the D.C. Circuit cases, despite some
of their internal tensions. Rather than seeing the statute as creating an obli-
gation on upwind states collectively to limit their combined downwind pol-
lution loads, the court emphasized that each upwind state had an individual
responsibility to do so. That duty was expressed in various terms as requir-
ing at least a cost-effective (Michigan), “measurable” (North Carolina), or
upwind States’ significant contribution would be, at most, 162/3 units. Or suppose
instead that the three upwind States contribute 10, 20, and 30 units respectively.
Distributing those obligations in a manner proportional to their contributions,
those three States’ significant contributions would be at most 81/3, 162/3, and 25
units, respectively, leading to the combined reduction of 50 units needed for the
downwind State to reach attainment.
Id.
81. Id. at 21-22.
82. Id. at 22.
83. Id. at 23-24.
84. Id. at 26-27.
85. Id. at 27.
86. Id. at 38.
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“proportional” reduction in downwind pollution (EME Homer). But the
statute can also be read differently, as allowing any set of upwind emission
cuts that will bring the downwind state into attainment.
As Judge Kavanaugh read the statute, it essentially calls for a two-step
process. First, EPA has to determine the quantity that counts as a “signifi-
cant” addition to a downwind state’s pollution. EPA apparently did that
acceptably. Second, EPA must determine the total reduction required for
each downwind state and allocate that total among upwind states in propor-
tion to their share of the excess pollutants, minus the “insignificant” quan-
tity they are allowed to continue emitting. The statute does not explicitly
call for proportionality. As we will see in Part II, the Supreme Court de-
voted considerable attention to the question of whether the D.C. Circuit
was right in discerning a proportionality mandate. Part III will discuss the
Court’s analysis of whether cost was an allowable consideration assuming
that EPA had discretion to depart from proportionality.
II. IS PROPORTIONALITY REQUIRED BY THE
GOOD NEIGHBOR PRINCIPLE?
Judge Kavanaugh’s proportionality requirement would have sharply
constricted EPA’s efforts to implement the good neighbor provision. The
question of whether proportionality would be a workable approach was
complex, however, and required the Court to delve into the allocation prob-
lem in some depth. We begin by showing how the concept of proportional
reductions in excess pollution in a downwind state can be translated into
proportional cuts in upwind emissions. This shift makes application of the
proportionality concept much easier. We then examine how proportionality
differs in effect from the approach taken by EPA. With this background, we
turn to the conflicting views about this issue discussed in the Supreme
Court’s majority and dissenting opinions.
A. Implications of Proportionality
There are two ways of thinking about proportionality, and it may not
be immediately obvious that they are identical.87 We could think of propor-
tionality on the downwind side as maintaining the proportions by which the
upwind states contribute to nonattainment. Or, we could think of propor-
tionality on the upwind side as involving proportional emission cuts (or,
87. Note, however, that this conclusion requires that downwind contributions be pro-
portional to upwind emissions, which may not always hold in practice. To the extent that the
relationship between upwind emissions and downwind contributions is nonlinear, the prob-
lem becomes more complex, and that complexity would make the argument for deference to
EPA’s approach even stronger.
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equivalently, as maintaining the proportions between the total volumes of
emissions). Shifting the focus from proportional contributions to propor-
tional emissions makes the analysis much simpler, because it shifts the focus
from effects (i.e., changes in downwind contributions) to causes (i.e., cuts
in upwind emissions). A good deal of confusion in the opinions from both
the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court stems from viewing proportional-
ity through the contribution lens, rather than the emissions lens.
To see that these two perspectives are equivalent, consider a hypotheti-
cal involving two upwind states—A and B—and a single downwind state.
Assume that total pollution coming into the downwind state needs to be cut
from twelve units to eight units to bring State 1 into attainment:
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* A small technical point: State 1 may well attain the air quality standards during some 
time periods and fail to do so during others. The meteorological conditions may vary 
between those two categories of times. The dilution factor is the average dilution limited to 
the time periods of nonattainment in State 1. 
To unpack Table 1 a bit, the first column measures the total emissions
from the upwind state. The second column (the dilution factor) reflects the
proportion of an upwind state’s emissions that actually reach the downwind
state. Thus, if State A emits twelve units, we have to divide by the dilution
factor of four, so that only three of those units reach the downwind state.
Combining this data results in the third column. Similarly, for State B, half
of the total emissions (twelve) reach the downwind state, leaving us with
nine units in the third column. Adding up the figures in column three, we
see that twelve units are reaching the downwind states; to reach attainment,
we need to get this down to four units, requiring a cut of eight units. Cur-
rently, State A’s contribution is one-third of State B’s, so we need to dis-
tribute the cuts by the same one to three ratio, with two units cut from
State A and six from State B.
Now we work backwards from contribution cuts to emission cuts. In
order to cut State A’s downwind contribution by two units, we need to cut
emissions by eight units, given the dilution factor of four. Similarly, State B
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will need to cut emissions by twelve units in order to cut its downwind
contribution by six units, given the dilution factor of two. This gives us the
last column. The key point is that, although the amount to be cut differs in
the two upwind states, the percentage of emissions that need to be cut is the
same.
The point can be made more general, however: if amounts of pollution
reaching downwind states are proportional to amounts of pollution emitted,
then proportionate reductions in excess pollution downwind require propor-
tionate reductions in pollution emitted upwind. It would be too generous to
call this observation a theorem, but some simple algebra suffices to establish
the following result:
Proportionality Equivalence. Let X be the amount of emissions in State
A, and let Y be the amount of emissions in State B. Let A1 be State A’s
contribution to pollutant concentrations in State 1, and A2 be the pollutant
contributions to concentrations in State 2. Similarly, let State B’s emissions
be Y, and let B1 be State B’s contribution to pollution in State 1 and B2 be
State B’s contribution to pollution in State 2. Also assume that the contri-
butions are linear functions of emissions, so that: A1 = a1X, B1 = b2Y, A2 =
a2X, and B2 = b2Y. Then, achieving attainment in both states through a
proportional reduction in state contributions to downwind pollution is
equivalent to reducing emissions proportionately.88
The key point is that the percentage reductions in pollution end up
being the same for both states. This is, in some ways, a fairly intuitive
result. Imagine having a stereo where the two speakers have individual vol-
ume control. If the music is too loud but the listener wants to maintain the
existing balance between the speakers, obviously the volumes of both speak-
ers have to be turned down proportionately. The air pollution situation is
similar.
Thus, if we want to make reductions of upwind states’ contribution to
nonattainment proportional to their current contributions, they will need to
cut their emissions by equal percentages. The equivalence between these
two ways of looking at proportionality (proportional contributions or equal
88. Proof. Suppose that the proportionate reduction required for attainment in State 1
is m1 and the proportionate reduction required for State 2 is m2. Thus, the new contribution
of State A to State 1 pollution is m1A1 = m1a1X = a1(m1X), and similarly the new contribution
of State B to State 1 is m2B1=m1a1Y=a1(m1Y). Thus, to reduce their pollution contributions to
State 1 by a factor of m1, both upwind states need to reduce emissions by a factor of m1.
Similarly, to reduce their pollution contributions in State 2 by a factor of m2, both upwind
states need to reduce emissions by a factor of m2. To achieve attainment in both states will
require emissions reductions by whichever of these factors is larger, say m2, resulting in
proportionate reductions in pollution contributions in both downwind states by a factor of
m2.
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emission reductions) makes it possible to use the second way for diagram-
ming, which turns out to be much simpler.89 It also allows us to think in
terms of the percentage of emissions reductions at the upwind source, rather
than the amount of pollution reduction in the multiple downwind states
linked with the upwind state, and to thereby avoid a great deal of confusion.
We can get an idea of what proportionality looks like in practice from
two additional diagrams. The proportionality approach requires both states
to make the same percentage decreases, so the outcome must lie on the
dotted diagonal line in the document. In Figure 3, we see that when a
“sweet spot” exists where both downwind states are perfectly in attainment,
the proportionality approach will result in unnecessary over-control in one
of the states. The only exception is where the “sweet spot” (Point X) hap-
pens to be located on the diagonal.
FIGURE 3. PROPORTIONALITY WITH INTERSECTING
COMPLIANCE CURVES
On the other hand, if there is no cross-over, the situation will look like
the one depicted by Figure 4. The mix of controls is dictated by the point
labeled X, where the State 2 line crosses the dotted diagonal. In this scena-
rio, over-control in State 1 is inevitable, but insistence on proportionality
increases the amount of over-control, which could be reduced by moving
upward and left from Point X on the State 2 line.
89. See supra Figures 1 and 2.
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FIGURE 4. PROPORTIONALITY ABSENT A UNIQUE
COMPLIANCE POINT
As these examples make clear, there is a tension between the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s insistence on proportionality and its direction that EPA limit pollu-
tion cuts to the amount needed to bring each downwind state into
attainment.
B. The Stakes in EME Homer
To see clearly what was at stake in EME Homer, it is helpful to use two
additional diagrams. EPA essentially cut off the ends from each of the com-
pliance lines where compliance costs exceeded the ceiling or where the
state’s contribution was no longer significant. In addition, it basically re-
quired each state to comply to the point where its compliance costs hit the
ceiling. Thus, EPA mandated pollution controls at a specific percentage
level for each state, a position it continued to defend in the Supreme Court.
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FIGURE 5. EPA COST APPROACH (NON-INTERSECTING CASE)
In Figure 5, the arrows on the axes represent the mandated level of
control for each state. Point Z corresponds to the mix of controls from the
two states resulting from the EPA cost requirement. We see that the result
of EPA’s action is the setting of the mixture of controls to a point that is
near but not on the compliance line for State 2, while somewhat increasing
the amount of over-control for State 1. Also, the mandated mix of controls
(Point Z) is near the diagonal of proportional reductions. The first observa-
tion is no coincidence: EPA picked the compliance ceilings with the statu-
tory attainment requirements in mind (here indicated by the line for State
2). The second observation, however, is a coincidence, resulting from the
fact that incremental control costs are not that different between the states.
If one state already had so many controls that further reductions exceeded
the ceiling, while the other state had many options for cheap reduction,
Point Z would have been near the top or the right side of the diagram, not
near the diagonal. Figure 6 shows a variation, involving a situation in which
it would be possible to avoid over-control. In this scenario, the cost ceilings
result in a level of control—Point Z—near the cross-over point, where both
downwind states are precisely in compliance. But, again, this is something
of a coincidence.
The more notable point illustrated by Figure 6 is how far away Point Z
is from the diagonal of the square, which would represent proportional con-
trols. The reason for this is that State A has limited ability to cut emissions
in a cost effective manner, whereas State B has the ability to reduce cut to
the point where they cease to be significant for the downwind states. Thus,
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almost all of the compliance responsibility falls on State B, driving the re-
quired mix of controls—again, Point Z—far from the diagonal.
FIGURE 6. EPA COST APPROACH (INTERSECTING CASE)
The respondents in EME Homer sought to defend the D.C. Circuit’s
interpretation of the law. In effect, the court of appeals required that, in-
stead of Point Z, EPA pick the point where the State 1 line crossed the
diagonal. That would nearly double State B’s emissions reduction over
EPA’s approach (as represented by Point Z). Given that Point Z represents
the limits of what EPA would consider economically feasible for State B,
there would clearly be a major economic burden on that state, while State A
would bear a relatively smaller cost because its own emissions reductions
would be even lower than EPA’s cap.
Thus, the stakes in EME Homer were significant, having the potential
for substantial impacts regarding the issues of which states would have to
reduce emissions and at what cost. The D.C. Circuit’s insistence that EPA
stick to the diagonal regardless of cost would have had major repercussions
for many states, with a particular heavy burden on states that could only
make further reductions of emissions at great expense. It is also clear that,
under many circumstances, insisting on proportionality increases the
amount of control in all but the most polluted downwind state.
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C. The Supreme Court and the Proportionality Requirement
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion poses a numerical hypothetical90
that is somewhat difficult to grasp in narrative form, but can be presented
more simply in tabular form (Table 2). Suppose we have two downwind
states and two upwind states, with pollution linkages, as shown in Table 2.
TABLE 2. GINSBURG HYPOTHETICAL
 Upwind State 1 Upwind State 2 Total Pollution 
Received by 
Downwind State 
Downwind State A 1 5 6 
Downwind State B 7 1 8 
Upwind State’s Total 
Emissions 
8 6  
The Court’s conclusion is that “[p]roportionality as to one down-wind
State will not achieve proportionality as to others” since in State A, State 2
will have to reduce its contribution by five times as much as State 1,
whereas in State B, State A will have to reduce its contribution by seven
times more than State B.91 But this is a confused way to consider propor-
tionality, as Justice Scalia points out in his dissent. It is true that State 1’s
pollution contribution to State A will have to be a larger amount than State
2’s in absolute terms (by a factor of five), but both can still reduce their
emissions by identical percentages. For instance, if we need to cut total
incoming pollution in State B by three units, we can cut emissions in State 1
90.
To illustrate, consider a variation on the example set out above. Imagine that
States X and Y now contribute air pollution to State A in a ratio of one to five,
i.e., State Y contributes five times the amount of pollution to State A than does
State X. If State A were the only downwind State to which the two upwind States
contributed, the D.C. Circuit’s proportionality requirement would be easy to
meet: EPA could require State Y to reduce its emissions by five times the amount
demanded of State X. The realities of interstate air pollution, however, are not so
simple. Most upwind States contribute pollution to multiple downwind States in
varying amounts. Suppose then that States X and Y also contribute pollutants to a
second downwind State (State B), this time in a ratio of seven to one. Though
State Y contributed a relatively larger share of pollution to State A, with respect
to State B, State X is the greater offender. Following the proportionality approach
with respect to State B would demand that State X reduce its emissions by seven
times as much as State Y. Recall, however, that State Y, as just hypothesized, had
to effect five times as large a reduction with respect to State A.
EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1605.
91. Id.
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in half and emissions in State 2 in half. Then, State 1’s contribution will be
0.5 units in State A, and State 2’s contribution will be 2.5 units in State A.
The same percentage will also bring State B exactly into attainment, if
State B happens to be four units out of attainment. In that case, propor-
tional reductions will produce exact attainment in both states. So, the Court
is not quite correct to think that compliance with proportionality in both
states is impossible, even if this will occur only in limited circumstances.
What is true, however, is that unless the required percentage reductions
happen to be the same, it is normally not possible both to maintain propor-
tionality and eliminate over-control in one of the states.92
This conclusion is an example of something we have already seen in
diagrammatic terms in Figure 3. It simply illustrates the more general pro-
position that, except in the case where the attainment lines for the down-
wind states cross and where the crossing-point happens to lie on the
diagonal, it is impossible to bring both states precisely into attainment
through proportional reductions.93 However, proportional cuts will always
work to bring one state precisely into attainment while bringing the other at
least to attainment (and in fact beyond).
The Court makes a more significant slip in a footnote accompanying
this discussion where, in response to Justice Scalia’s dissent, it argues that
proportionality could result in a situation where both states must over-con-
trol their pollution.94 This is incorrect. If it is possible to bring each state
92. Judge Kavanagh had a suggestion about how to address the problem of over-
control:
For example, suppose that under the proportional approach explained above, State
A would have to cut 5,000 tons of NOx to achieve its largest downwind obligation,
while State B would have to cut 2,000 tons to achieve its largest downwind obliga-
tion. If EPA modeling showed that all downwind nonattainment would be re-
solved if those two upwind States’ combined reduction obligations were, say, 10%
lower, EPA would have to ratchet back the upwind States’ reduction obligations by
a total of 10%. That would ensure that upwind States were only forced to prohibit
those emissions that “contribute significantly to nonattainment.
Id. at 7, 22 n. 16 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Unfortunately, this example is difficult to parse. If all the
states contribute to nonattainment in all downwind states, then cutting emissions from the
proportional allocation will necessarily throw one of the downwind states out of attainment.
93. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
94.
Assume the world is made up of only four States—two upwind (States X and Y),
and two downwind (States A and B). Suppose also, as the dissent allows, that the
reductions State X must make to eliminate its share of the amount by which State
A is in nonattainment are more than necessary for State X to eliminate its share of
State B’s nonattainment. As later explained, this kind of “over-control,” we agree
with the dissent, is acceptable under the statute. Suppose, however, that State Y
also contributes to pollution in both State A and State B such that the reductions
it must make to eliminate its proportion of State B’s overage exceed the reductions
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separately into attainment by some level of proportional reductions in that
state, then both attainment lines will cross the diagonal.95 One of the cross-
ing points must be northeast of the other (that is, requiring greater emis-
sions reductions from both upwind states). That point brings one of the
states—the one whose attainment line crosses the diagonal—into exact com-
pliance, while creating attainment in the other state, though at the expense
of requiring that air quality in that state be reduced substantially beyond the
level needed for compliance.96
A graphical presentation may again be helpful. The Court seems to
have in mind a situation in which each state’s contributions make little dif-
ference in one state but are critical in the other. This situation is shown in
Figure 7 below. Note that to keep State 1 in attainment, a very large in-
crease in emissions control from State B allows only a small relaxation of
controls from State A as we move from the left side of the State 1 attain-
ment line down toward the right. The slopes of the lines reflect the relative
influence of emissions changes in the two upwind states on attainment in
each downwind state. It is clear that Point Y, where the State 1 attainment
line crosses the diagonal, brings both downwind states into compliance, in-
it must make to bring State A into attainment. In this case, the dissent would have
State X reduce by just enough to eliminate its share of State A’s nonattainment
and more than enough to eliminate its share of State B’s overage. The converse
will be true as to State Y: Under the dissent’s approach, State Y would have to
reduce by the “minimum” necessary to eliminate its proportional share of State B’s
nonattainment and more than enough to eliminate its proportion of State A’s
overage. The result is that the total amount by which both States X and Y are
required to reduce will exceed what is necessary for attainment in all downwind
States involved (i.e., in both State A and State B). Over-control thus unnecessary to
achieving attainment in all involved States is impermissible under the Good
Neighbor Provision. (citation omitted) The problem would worsen were the hypo-
thetical altered to include more than two downwind States and two upwind States,
the very real circumstances EPA must address.
EME Homer, 134 S.Ct. at 1609 n.19.
95. This will always be true, at least if eliminating all upwind emissions (perhaps com-
bined with downwind reductions) would bring the downwind state into attainment. That
would mean that the upper right corner of the diagram would be in attainment. On the other
hand, the lower left corner must not be in attainment because it represents the statute quo.
(If the downwind state were already in attainment, the good neighbor provision would not
apply in the first place.) If the upper right corner would achieve precise attainment, we are
done. If not, then the pollution amount in the upper right corner of the diagram is below the
attainment level. In that case, since the down-state’s pollution is above the air quality stan-
dard at one corner and below it in the other, and the function is continuous, there must be
some point in between where the two are exactly equal. That point is on the attainment
curve.
96. This conclusion does not require linearity, but merely that whatever the shape of
the attainment curves, they cross the diagonal somewhere.
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volving no over-control in one state but unavoidable over-control in the
other. Thus, it is possible to bring both states into attainment with propor-
tional reductions, contrary to the Court’s assumption that the asymmetry in
the situations of the various states would mean that proportional reductions
would cause over-control in both downwind states.
FIGURE 7. EXISTENCE OF COMPLIANCE POINT
UNDER PROPORTIONALITY
For those who are not graphically inclined, the point can be put more
simply. There is a basic recipe that can be used to ensure that all states are
in attainment, reductions are proportional, and at least one state avoids
over-control. Step one is to adopt provisional proportional controls keyed to
each downwind state, which may well involve different percentage reduc-
tions for different downwind states. Step two is to identify the downwind
state for which the required percentage is the highest. Step three is to re-
quire all the upwind states to reduce emissions by that percentage, whether
or not they significantly contribute to nonattainment in that specific down-
wind state. This may result in massive over-control in other states in some
cases. But it does meet the requirements that no state will be out of attain-
ment, and all reductions will be proportional.
The upshot is that Justice Scalia’s dissent is correct, in that it is always
possible to bring both states into attainment through proportional reduc-
tions and to have exact attainment in one of them.97 But he is wrong when
he argues that “it is easy to imagine precluding unnecessary over-control by
97. EME Homer, 134 S.Ct. at 1614 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This again assumes a linear
relationship between emissions and downstate pollution.
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reducing in a percent-based manner the burdens of each upwind State
linked to a given downwind area.”98 Doing so would require that the attain-
ment lines for both states cross the diagonal at the same point, which gener-
ally will not occur. So long as the attainment lines cross the diagonal at
different points, achieving attainment in one will entail over-control in the
other.
The majority’s error on this point is not critical to its overall argument.
The fundamental dispute between the majority and the dissent can be seen
clearly in terms of a much simpler hypothetical posed by the majority in-
volving three states, each of them contributing equally to a thirty parts per
billion (ppb) overage in the same downwind state’s pollution level.99 The
majority’s analysis of this simple situation really goes to the heart of its
reasoning:
How is EPA to divide responsibility among the three States?
Should the Agency allocate reductions proportionally (10 ppb
each), on a per capita basis, on the basis of the cost of abatement, or
by some other metric? The Good Neighbor Provision does not an-
swer that question for EPA. Under Chevron, we read Congress’ si-
lence as a delegation of authority to EPA to select from among
reasonable options.100
In other words, the majority sees any point on the attainment line as
satisfying the statute. Justice Scalia’s view was sharply different. He could
scarcely contain his outrage and incredulity at this analysis, saying the ques-
tion of how to allocate the emission cuts was “a hard one—almost of the
equivalent of asking who is buried in Grant’s Tomb.”101 Tracking the D.C.
Circuit’s approach,102 he explains his answer simply: “If the criterion of re-
sponsibility is amounts of pollutants, then surely shared responsibility must be
based upon relative amounts of pollutants.”103
Justice Scalia seems to have been guilty of something of a non sequitur
here. A requirement to cut “amounts” of various kinds does not necessarily
mean cutting them in proportion to the current excess. For instance, sup-
pose that a household is spending more than its income and is required to
cut the amounts of expenditure in all categories to eliminate the deficit. It
would make no sense to reach this target by cutting food, health, and en-
98. Id. at 1615 n.2.
99. Id. at 1604 (majority opinion).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1613 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. See text accompanying supra notes 70 to 86.
103. EME Homer, 134 S. Ct. at 1613.
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tertainment expenses in equal proportion, without taking into account the
needs in each category. A decision to cut “amounts” is not a decision to cut
all amounts in equal ratios.
The two sides seem to have been talking past each other since they
apparently understand the language of the statute in deeply inconsistent
ways. Unfortunately, neither side seems to understand the other’s percep-
tion. One side sees the language as imposing a collective duty, while the
other sees it as imposing multiple individual duties.
The majority views the statute as mandating the following outcome: at
the end of the day, no state can be contributing significantly to nonattain-
ment. That outcome could be achieved in many ways. Unless a state opts
out by simply reducing its downwind contribution below the level of signifi-
cance, it becomes part of a collective process of improving downwind pollu-
tion. From that perspective, the good neighbor provision is analogous to the
process of designing a state implementation plan to address a state’s own
pollution and the flexibility involved therein. So long as the end result is
attainment (and the other provisions of the Act are complied with), any
allocation of emission cuts is acceptable. The difference is only that the
good neighbor provision involves a collective effort to achieve attainment
involving multiple states, rather than just one.
But Justice Scalia reads the statute as imposing an individualized duty
on each upwind state: once a finding is made that downwind states are out
of compliance because of upwind emissions, that finding triggers equal, in-
dependent duties on downwind states to reduce their own emissions. No
state’s duty can depend on another’s performance of its obligation, so the
duty must be based solely on the level of prior emission contributions by
that state. Given Scalia’s assumption about the nature of the statute, it is
not surprising that he finds the majority opinion incomprehensible except
as an exercise in raw policymaking. If the statute mandates a process of
proportional reductions, obviously EPA has little discretion to redirect
emissions cuts between states. (Indeed, the states themselves would have
little discretion to reallocate cuts internally to achieve the same end result,
given that the statute requires that no source contribute amounts that signifi-
cantly contribute to nonattainment.104) Thus, if several upwind states are
contributing to downwind attainment, they must share equally in taking
action to reduce emissions.
104. The good neighbor provision requires states to ensure that “any source or other
type of emissions activity within the State from emitting any air pollutant in amounts which
will” contribute to downwind nonattainment. CAA § 110(a)(2)(D)(i), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410(a)(2)(D)(i).
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It may be helpful to consider a similar difference in interpretation in a
much simpler context. Suppose that a beach has multiple lifeguards on
duty. One of the rules of the beach is that “a lifeguard must swim to the
rescue of a swimmer in distress.” Two different lifeguards see a swimmer
who is floundering. (This is analogous to a situation where two states are
contributing to downwind attainment, but either one separately could make
enough cuts to bring the downwind state into attainment.) Does the life-
guard rule require only that at least one of them swim to the rescue, making
this a collective duty? Or do they each have a duty to swim to the rescue,
making it an individual duty? The EME Homer majority would, by analogy,
say that it was enough if one lifeguard swam to the rescue, whereas Justice
Scalia would say that both must make equal efforts.105
This difference in perspectives on the statute is reflected in a dispute
about an important procedural aspect of the good neighbor provision. In
another portion of his opinion, Justice Scalia argues that EPA could not
immediately issue federal implementation plans to implement its rule, be-
cause states could not be fairly accused of violating their individual duties
under the statute until they had been told the amount of their individual
contributions to downwind nonattainment.106 This is quite consistent with
his view that the statute creates a mandate for individual upwind states to
adjust emissions downward once they are given a goal. The majority, in
contrast, held that the implementation plans of the upwind states were out
of compliance because of their collective impact on downwind states.
Hence, in the majority’s view, EPA was entitled to issue federal implemen-
tation plans on that basis without giving them further time to revise their
own plan.107 That position was consistent with its view that only the result
of the collective effort mattered; since the states had failed to achieve the
end result, it was time for EPA to step in.
The logic of the statute plainly supports the majority’s view that any
duty involved is collective, rather than going to individual states. The stat-
ute simply requires that a valid SIP must “contain adequate provisions
prohibiting, . . . any source or other type of emissions activity within the
State from emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will contribute sig-
nificantly to nonattainment in . . . any other State.”108 Note that this applies
only if the downwind state is out of attainment, which may depend on
105. Even in the lifeguard situation, that might not be an unreasonable view: although it
would involve some duplication of efforts, it would also increase the chances of success. See
generally EME Homer, 134 S. Ct. at 1584.
106. Id. at 1616-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 1600-02 (majority opinion).
108. CAA § 110(a)(2)(D)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i).
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emissions from other upwind states. If an upwind state is making no signifi-
cant contribution to downwind non-attainment, or if the downwind state is
in attainment, then the implementation plan of the upwind state is valid;
otherwise it is not. Thus, one upwind state would no longer be violating the
good neighbor provision if other upwind states cut their emissions enough
to bring the downwind state into compliance. The statute says nothing
about how the downwind state gets to be in attainment, nor does it require
any findings by EPA to trigger a SIP’s invalidity. It simply says when im-
plementation plans are valid and when they are not, which depends on the
collective impact of upwind emissions on the downwind states.
Indeed, it is difficult to see how the statute could be viewed as creating
a truly individual duty for downwind states to make proportional reduc-
tions. Even if all downwind states knew the extent of their contributions to
downwind nonattainment, unless they all agreed to comply voluntarily and
in exact unison, their reductions would constantly shift the relative propor-
tions of their contributions to downwind nonattainment, requiring in turn
that they constantly revise their compliance efforts to keep pace.
For instance, suppose that two states each contribute twelve units to
downwind pollution, that the total upwind contribution must be cut by
twelve units in order to achieve compliance (requiring each to cut six under
the Scalia approach), and that both states are determined to voluntarily
comply with the statute. Assume one state was able to cut the entire six
units allocated to it before the other was able to make any cuts. Since six of
the required dozen units have now been cut, there are now six left to go.
The first state is now contributing six units while the second is still at
twelve. Under Scalia’s interpretation, the statute now requires proportionate
cuts of the remaining six units. Thus, further cuts must now be distributed
in a two to one proportion, with the first state contributing another two
units while the second state must now cut only four (instead of the six
originally assigned it). After these cuts are made, the states are now both in
compliance, but the path to compliance makes little sense. The net result is
that, although the principle of proportionality has been applied strictly at
each step, the end result is anything but proportional, with the first state
cutting a total of eight units and the second state cutting only four.
The reality is that even under the proportionality approach, the reduc-
tions required of one upwind state depend on what all the other upwind
states are doing, so it is impossible to imagine anything other than a coordi-
nated effort. It makes little sense to see the statute as imposing an individu-
alized responsibility on each state to reduce its downwind contributions to
nonattainment proportionately. Once we recognize that a coordinated, col-
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lective effort is needed, it is hard to resist the majority’s argument that this
collective obligation can be satisfied in more than one way.
The majority’s reading of the statute is strengthened by consideration
of the over-control problem.109 The Court’s approach gives EPA discretion
to choose a level of control for each state necessary for downwind compli-
ance. That seems consistent with the statute’s goal of imposing only the
controls that are necessary to bring downwind states into compliance (rather
than maximizing air quality in downwind states).
Although the majority got some of the details wrong, it grasped the
more important point that there are many ways of meeting the downwind
attainment goal of the good neighbor provision. Imposing a rigid require-
ment that upwind states cut emissions by equal percentages is not only
somewhat arbitrary, but it is almost sure to undermine other statutory
goals, such as making states do no more than necessary to meet statutory
targets. The statutory language simply did not require putting EPA in such
a straightjacket.
That the justices had difficulties in grasping some important details of
the problem, even in the highly simplified examples used in the opinions, is
also noteworthy. It is important to realize just how simplified those exam-
ples (and the ones in this Article) really were. They involve very small
numbers of upwind and downwind states, nonattainment of only a single
pollutant, no states that are both upwind and downwind, and no modeling
uncertainties. Yet, even with these simplifications, it is not necessarily easy
to understand the ramifications of a proportionality requirement; it is even
more difficult to do so in the much more complex situation that EPA faced.
In the face of this complexity, it seems a stretch to assume that Con-
gress had a clear-cut solution in mind. If there is ever a time for delegation
109. This is a problem that could lead to bizarre consequences under a strict proportion-
ality requirement. Recall the Court’s hypothetical where three upwind states are contributing
ten ppb to a thirty ppb excess over the air quality standard in one downwind state. Now
consider a situation involving three upwind states and two downwind states. The three up-
wind states are responsible for only small contributions to nonattainment in the downwind
state and could solve that problem with small emissions reductions. However, two of those
upwind states are also upwind of another state where their emissions are causing severe
problems, hence, they must make major pollution cuts. Those severe cuts are actually enough
to bring the first downwind state into compliance, but proportionality would require equally
severe cuts from the third upwind state so that they would all be contributing equal shares.
The result is that the third upwind state is forced to make major pollution cuts that do
nothing to serve the purpose of the statute just because the other two upwind states have to
make major cuts anyway. Note that proportionality is still possible in this situation; it is just
irrationally wasteful. Proponents of proportionality might conceivably be willing to make an
exception in this situation and require lesser emissions reductions from the third state than
the other two states.
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to an agency, dealing with an issue of this kind seems to be the appropriate
occasion. To the extent that Congress was concerned with achieving down-
wind attainment efficiently, the statute gives no clue on how to do so. To
the extent that Congress might instead have been concerned about equity,
multiple standards of fairness could apply here (including both proportional
cuts and cost equality). And, to the extent that Congress might have had
political concerns about which specific upwind states would bear the heavi-
est burden, it really had no way of anticipating the answer without the
technical modeling that EPA later performed. It is unreasonable to think
that by referring to the “amount” of emissions, the statute created an al-
gorithm for allocating cuts.
The complexity of the problem also has commonsense implications for
judicial review. The issue is not the intellectual capacity of the justices (or
their law clerks) to grasp the basic issues (as opposed to the modeling
problems, for which they lacked the necessary expertise). But Supreme
Court litigation does not provide an ideal learning situation for judges to
master unfamiliar technical material.110 The limitations on the ability of
appellate judges to pursue technical issues in great depth are substantial.
Sometimes, judicial deference to an expert agency is not just a matter of
respecting the separation of powers—it is also common sense.
III. COULD EPA CONSIDER COST IN IMPLEMENTING
THE GOOD NEIGHBOR PRINCIPLE?
Although the D.C. Circuit devoted most of its attention to defending
the proportional reductions rule, it clearly had concerns about the use of
cost as an alternative. Observing that “[t]he good neighbor provision is one
of more than 20 SIP requirements in Section 110(a)(2),” that court viewed
it as “inconceivable that Congress buried in Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I)—the
good neighbor provision—an open-ended authorization for EPA to effec-
tively force every power plant in the upwind States to install every emis-
sions control technology EPA deems ‘cost-effective.’ ”111 As this passage
indicates, the court was particularly concerned that EPA could require
110. Imagine a class in which the students are expected to learn difficult material
outside of their previous area of knowledge. In class, they hear conflicting explanations from
two teachers who disagree about the material, delivered during a one-hour session partly
devoted to other matters and frequently interrupted by questions from other students. Then
imagine there are few if any visual aids, little opportunity for questions, no opportunity at all
for out-of-class follow up with the instructors or to contact other experts for information, no
feedback in the form of homework, and a busy annual schedule in which the student group
has to produce over seventy other “term papers.” One would not expect that the students in
such a class, however talented, would be in a good position to master the material.
111. EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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states to reduce emissions below the point that was originally judged too
insignificant to justify including a state in the regulation.112
Once the Supreme Court majority had disposed of the D.C. Circuit’s
proportionality requirement, EPA clearly had some discretion in setting
standards. That discretion could have been exercised in various ways, such
as allocating emission responsibilities most heavily to states where the re-
ductions would help them achieve attainment themselves. Alternatively,
EPA might have tried to maximize the public health benefits of the emis-
sion reductions by focusing the collateral benefits of any over-control on
areas with high populations. Instead, it chose cost as the basis.
As we will see below, the Court had previously struggled with the role
of cost in regulations under federal pollution law. EME Homer provided an
opportunity for it to return to that issue.
A. The Precedents
Prior to EME Homer, the Court had decided three cases relating to
EPA’s consideration of costs under federal pollution statutes.113 Union Elec-
tric v. EPA114 was the first case in this series. The issue was whether EPA
was required to consider the economic or technological feasibility of a SIP
prior to approving it. In an opinion by Justice Marshall, the Court had little
difficulty in upholding EPA’s refusal to do so.
Justice Marshall relied both on the general purposes of the Act and on
the language of section 110. Regarding the statute’s purposes, he said:
As we have previously recognized, the 1970 Amendments to the
Clean Air Act were a drastic remedy to what was perceived as a
serious and otherwise uncheckable problem of air pollution. The
Amendments place the primary responsibility for formulating pol-
lution control strategies on the States, but nonetheless subject the
States to strict minimum compliance requirements. These require-
ments are of a “technology-forcing character” and are expressly de-
signed to force regulated sources to develop pollution control
devices that might at the time appear to be economically or techno-
logically infeasible.115
112. Id. at 23-24.
113. In addition, it considered a somewhat similar issue in another statutory setting in
American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981), also known
as the “cotton dust” case. The Court rejected agency use of cost-benefit analysis in establish-
ing workplace regulation of toxic chemicals. Id. at 512.
114. Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
115. Id. at 256-57 (citation omitted).
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Justice Marshall found this approach to be “apparent” in section 110.
Section 110 sets out a list of provisions and “provides that if these criteria
are met and if the plan was adopted after reasonable notice and hearing, the
Administrator [of the EPA] ‘shall approve’ the proposed state plan.”116 He
added that the “mandatory ‘shall’ makes it quite clear that the Administra-
tor is not to be concerned with factors other than those specified, and none
of the eight factors appears to permit consideration of technological or eco-
nomic infeasibility.”117
The next case was nearly twenty-five years later. Whitman v. American
Trucking involved the question of whether EPA could consider cost at an
earlier stage of the process—in setting national air quality standards under
the Clean Air Act, as opposed to the formulation of the subsequent SIPs.118
In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court upheld EPA’s view that consider-
ation of costs was precluded. At heart, Justice Scalia found the issue
straightforward:
Section 109(b)(1) instructs EPA to set primary ambient air quality
standards “the attainment and maintenance of which . . . are requi-
site to protect the public health” with “an adequate margin of
safety.” Were it not for the hundreds of pages of briefing respon-
dents have submitted on the issue, one would have thought it fairly
clear that this text does not permit EPA to consider costs in setting
the standards. The language, as one scholar has noted, “is absolute.”
EPA, “based on” the information about health effects contained in
the technical “criteria” documents compiled under section
108(a)(2), is to identify the maximum airborne concentration of a
pollutant that the public health can tolerate, decrease the concen-
tration to provide an “adequate” margin of safety, and set the stan-
dard at that level. Nowhere are the costs of achieving such a
standard made part of that initial calculation.119
Justice Scalia also invoked some general principles in reading the Clean
Air Act. Because the statute provides many explicit references to cost, “[w]e
have therefore refused to find implicit in ambiguous sections of the CAA an
authorization to consider costs that has elsewhere, and so often, been ex-
pressly granted.”120 Because section 109 is the “engine” that drives so much
of the statute, he added, the textual references to cost must be clear in this
116. Id. at 257.
117. Id. (citation omitted).
118. Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
119. Id. at 465 (citations omitted).
120. Id. at 467.
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setting.121 Scalia rebuffed industry efforts to extract some contrary implica-
tions about costs from the statutory language, tartly remarking that “Con-
gress . . . does not hide elephants in mouseholes.”122 He argued that
consideration of cost “is both so indirectly related to public health and so full
of potential for canceling the conclusions drawn from direct health effects
that it would surely have been expressly mentioned in [the text] had Con-
gress meant it to be considered.”123
The third case in the series, Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper,124 involved the
Clean Water Act rather than the Clean Air Act. Section 316(b) of the Clean
Water Act requires that the “location, design, construction, and capacity of
water intake structures reflect the best technology available for minimizing
adverse environmental impact.”125 EPA had declined to require closed-sys-
tem cooling for power plants, which would have minimized the need for
plants to draw from water bodies and thereby would have minimized the
damage caused to aquatic life by the intake systems. EPA’s rationale was
that closed systems were extremely expensive and that other forms of con-
trol “could approach” their environmental benefits.126
In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Entergy Court upheld EPA’s inter-
pretation of the statute to permit such tradeoffs between costs and benefits.
He found the phrase “best technology to minimize environmental impacts”
ambiguous, since “best” is a somewhat flexible term. Moreover, the statute
used more emphatic language elsewhere (such as “drastically minimize”)
when Congress wanted to ensure attainment of an absolute minimum.127
Justice Scalia also rejected efforts to analogize to other provisions of the
statute mandating various levels of pollution control technologies, since
they each provided more guidance than the simple reference to “best tech-
nology” and had a more drastic goal of eventually eliminating all
pollution.128
Although Justice Stevens argued in dissent that American Trucking was
controlling,129 Justice Scalia found it readily distinguishable:
In American Trucking, we held that the text of § 109 of the Clean
Air Act, “interpreted in its statutory and historical context . . .
121. Id. at 468.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 469.
124. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. 208 (2009).
125. Clean Water Act § 316(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b).
126. Id. at 208.
127. Id. at 218-20.
128. Id. at 221-22.
129. Id. at 239-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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unambiguously bars cost considerations” in setting air quality stan-
dards under that provision. The relevant “statutory context” in-
cluded other provisions in the Clean Air Act that expressly
authorized consideration of costs, whereas § 109 did not. American
Trucking thus stands for the rather unremarkable proposition that
sometimes statutory silence, when viewed in context, is best inter-
preted as limiting agency discretion. For the reasons discussed ear-
lier, [§ 316’s] silence cannot bear that interpretation.130
The upshot was that, while American Trucking seemingly embraced a
presumption that ambiguous provisions of the Clean Air Act should be read
to preclude consideration of cost, Entergy allowed EPA to interpret an am-
biguous provision of the Clean Water Act to preclude imposing dispropor-
tionate costs on industry.
Although the language of these decisions is not always easy to square,
they do have some common threads. First, the Court has been concerned in
all three cases about whether cost considerations would compromise the
overall purpose of the statute. Union Electric and American Trucking involved
the central regulatory mechanism of the Clean Air Act, and cost considera-
tions would have interfered with the public health imperatives underlying
the statute. Entergy, however, involved a peripheral provision that was not
clearly related to the central goal of water pollution prevention. Second, in
each of these cases, EPA’s view of the role of cost in the statutory provision
in question prevailed. That was obviously no guarantee of future success,
but it may have been a source of encouragement for the agency in EME
Homer.
B. The Court’s Ruling on the Permissibility
of Considering Cost
As it turned out, the agency had little to worry about on this score.
Having disposed of proportionality, the EME Homer court found it rela-
tively easy to accept cost as a replacement criterion for allocating emissions
cuts: “Lacking a dispositive statutory instruction to guide it, EPA’s decision,
we conclude, is a ‘reasonable’ way of filling the ‘gap left open by
Congress.’”131
The Court said EPA’s choice “makes good sense,” providing “an effi-
cient and equitable solution to the allocation problem the Good Neighbor
130. Id. at 223.
131. EPA v. EME Homer City Generator, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1607 (2014) (quoting
Chevron, USA v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (S. Ct. 1984)).
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Provision requires the Agency to address.”132 This approach was “[e]fficient
because EPA can achieve the levels of attainment, i.e., of emission reduc-
tions, the proportional approach aims to achieve, but at a much lower over-
all cost.”133 The Court added that EPA’s approach was also fair:
[B]y imposing uniform cost thresholds on regulated States, EPA’s
rule subjects to stricter regulation those States that have done rela-
tively less in the past to control their pollution. Upwind States that
have not yet implemented pollution controls of the same stringency
as their neighbors will be stopped from free riding on their neigh-
bors’ efforts to reduce pollution. They will have to bring down their
emissions by installing devices of the kind in which neighboring
States have already invested.134
In dissent, Justice Scalia sharply rejected the relevance of cost under the
statute. “It would be extraordinary,” he wrote, “for Congress, by use of the
single word ‘significantly,’ to transmogrify a statute that assigns responsi-
bility on the basis of amounts of pollutants emitted into a statute authoriz-
ing EPA to reduce interstate pollution in the manner that it believes most
efficient.”135 He also argued that the majority was in effect overruling Amer-
ican Trucking:
There are, indeed, numerous Clean Air Act provisions explicitly
permitting costs to be taken into account. American Trucking thus
demanded “a textual commitment of authority to the EPA to con-
sider costs”—a hurdle that the Good Neighbor Provision comes no-
where close to clearing. Today’s opinion turns its back upon that
case and is incompatible with that opinion.136
The majority responded that American Trucking was distinguishable be-
cause the statute there provided an “absolute” mandate based on public
health and precluded any other factor, whereas the good neighbor provision
“grants EPA discretion to eliminating ‘amounts [of pollution that] . . .
contribute significantly to nonattainment’ downwind,” but “fails to provide
any metric by which EPA can differentiate among the contributions of mul-
tiple upwind States.”137 Scalia rejected this effort to distinguish American
132. EME Homer, 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1607.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1612 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 1616 (citations omitted).
137. Id. at 1607 n.21 (majority opinion).
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Trucking, arguing that the good neighbor provision was just as “absolute” as
the provision at issue in the earlier case.138
The majority did, however, concede a limited amount of ground to the
D.C. Circuit’s analysis. It agreed with the lower court that cost considera-
tions cannot be used to lower a state’s downwind pollution below the level
that EPA had set as significant, nor can it be required to reduce its emis-
sions below the level where every downwind state is in attainment.139 De-
spite the possibility of minor instances of overreach along these lines, the
Court concluded that “EPA’s cost-effective allocation of emission reductions
among upwind States. . .is a permissible, workable, and equitable interpre-
tation of the Good Neighbor Provision.”140
Oddly, although it was discussed in the briefs,141 neither the majority
nor the dissent mentions the Entergy case, in which the Court (in an opinion
by Scalia himself) had declined to read American Trucking broadly. This
might have been due to the prior stances of the authors: Ginsburg dissented
in Entergy and may have preferred not to rely on it, while Scalia might have
found his previous majority opinion an awkward fit with his later dissent.
Or, perhaps, the case was not discussed because it involved the Clean Water
Act and seemed less relevant than American Trucking.
Where does EME Homer leave the issue of cost under federal pollutions
statutes? Along with Entergy, it seems to leave little force to the presump-
tion against consideration of cost articulated in American Trucking. On the
other hand, neither of the later decisions questions the holding in American
Trucking. The effort to distinguish American Trucking in EME Homer is not
satisfying. The opinion essentially distinguishes the two cases by saying that
EPA was limited to considering a single factor (which was not cost) in one
case, but was allowed to consider multiple factors (including cost) in the
other. The problem is that it can only make that distinction after interpret-
ing both statutes, so the Court’s explanation sheds no light on why the two
statutes are being interpreted differently.
The Court’s reference to the lack of a “metric” in EME Homer does
suggest another way of articulating the principle at work that is consistent
138. Id. at 1616 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 1608 (majority opinion). In the latter regard, however, the Court also ob-
served that “a degree of imprecision is inevitable in tackling the problem of interstate air
pollution,” apparently allowing EPA to include a margin of error due to modeling difficul-
ties. Id. at 1609.
140. Id. at 1610.
141. See, e.g., Brief for the Federal Petitioners at 44, EPA v. EME Homer City Genera-
tion, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014) (Nos. 12-1182 and 12-1183); Reply Brief of Respondents
Calpine Corporation and Exelon Corporation in Support of Petitioners at 10, EPA v. EME
Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014) (Nos. 12-1182 and 12-1183).
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with all three cases. Simply put, when a provision in a federal environmen-
tal statute explicitly provides one or more factors as the basis for EPA’s
decision, the presumption is that cost is not relevant unless it was one of the
listed factors. That accounts for American Trucking, where the statute clearly
flagged pollution impacts as the basis for regulation. On the other hand, in
Entergy, the statute did not provide a metric for determining the “best” tech-
nology. Similarly, in EME Homer, the Court interpreted the statute as pro-
viding no standard for allocating the cuts among upwind states.
Thus, the message is that a court should not begin by asking whether
cost is a permissible consideration. Instead, it should ask whether Congress
has flagged non-cost factors but left cost unmentioned. Of course, the EME
Homer Court disagreed with the dissent about that prior question, but,
given that disagreement, its refusal to follow American Trucking was justi-
fied. If this reading of EME Homer is correct, then cost should not be rele-
vant to environmental provisions that do provide a metric. For instance,
such statutes could be keyed to a different explicit standard such as the level
of risk, or a described type of emissions controls, or preservation of natural
areas.
The implications of EME Homer extend beyond the specific issues of
proportionality and cost. As we will see below, other provisions of the
Clean Air Act allow EPA to require state plans to meet certain require-
ments. In the past, these provisions have been relatively obscure, but, as it
turns out, they offer potential methods of dealing with the looming issue of
climate change.
C. Implications of EME Homer for EPA Carbon Regulations
Although the Clean Air Act’s core mechanism focuses on state efforts to
reduce local pollution,142 it extends more broadly, as shown by the good
neighbor provision. Yet, as EME Homer illustrates, implementing the stat-
ute in these broader contexts may be complicated. Perhaps it is not surpris-
ing that implementation problems have also been present in the case of
climate change, which involves a kind of planet-wide concept of good
neighbors.
Despite potential implementation difficulties, in Massachusetts v.
EPA,143 the Supreme Court held that greenhouse gases are air pollutants
under the Clean Air Act and that EPA’s determination of whether they
presented a sufficient risk to trigger regulation under the statute must be
based solely on scientific evidence rather than policy determinations. EPA
142. See supra text accompanying notes 6 to 15.
143. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
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then made a formal finding that greenhouse gases endanger human health
and safety.144 With this finding as a foundation, EPA has developed regula-
tions to reduce greenhouse gases.145 According to independent experts, EPA
regulation of power plants could “capture a potential reduction of five to ten
percent in GHG emissions from coal—as much as about three percent of
total U.S. emissions. . . .”146 In general, “it appears a regulatory approach
could achieve emissions reductions through mitigation in the domestic
economy of up to ten percent, relative to 2005 levels,” which “would be
comparable to domestic reductions that would have been achieved under the
legislative cap-and-trade proposal.”147
Along these lines, EPA has proposed regulations for new power plants
under section 111(b) of the Clean Air Act.148 Section 111(b)(1)(A) provides
for standards of performance for new stationary sources that cause or con-
tribute significantly to air pollution “which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare.”149
EPA has also proposed standards of performance for existing plants
under § 111(d),150 a previously obscure provision. Once section 111(b) stan-
dards are in place for a category of new sources, section 111(d) authorizes
EPA to require states to produce plans setting standards of performance for
existing sources in that category.151 These state plans are analogous to SIPs
144. See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,497 (Dec. 15, 2009).
145. The regulations are described on EPA’s website. See EPA, Regulatory Initiatives,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/initiatives/index.html (last updated Aug. 8, 2014). The
endangerment finding and the regulations were upheld in Coalition for Responsible Regula-
tion, Inc. v EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
146. Dallas Burtraw, Arthur G. Fraas, & Nathan D. Richardson, Greenhouse Gas Regula-
tion Under the Clean Air Act: A Guide for Economists, 5 REV. OF ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 293, 304
(2011).
147. Id. at 306.
148. CAA § 111(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b); EPA, Standards of Performance for Green-
house Gas Emissions From New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79
Fed. Reg. 10750 (proposed Feb. 26, 2014). It should be noted that EPA also adopted a
regulation addressing new source emissions under another provision of the Act, which were
upheld in large part in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
149. CAA § 111(b)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A).
150. CAA § 111(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d); EPA, Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines
for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34829 (pro-
posed June 18, 2014). See M. Rhead Enion, Using Section 111 of the Clean Air Act for Cap-and-
Trade of Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Obstacles and Solutions, 30 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1
(2012) (discussing § 111(d) and its application to carbon emissions); Robert R. Nordhaus &
Ilan W. Gutherz, Regulation of CO2 Emissions from Existing Power Plants Under §111(d) of the
Clean Air Act: Program Design and Statutory Authority, 44 ENVTL. L. REP . NEWS & ANALYSIS
10366 (2014).
151. CAA § 111(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1).
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both in the procedures for their adoption152 and in EPA’s power to enforce
the requirements.153
Some key questions will be about the scope of state plans in allocation
emissions reductions within the state, the permissibility of in-state or inter-
state trading, and the method used by EPA to set emissions reductions for
states. The statute’s definition of standard of performance is central to an-
swering these questions: “[t]he term ‘standard of performance’ means a
standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of emis-
sion limitation achievable through the application of the best system of
emissions reduction which . . . the Administrator determines has been ade-
quately demonstrated.”154 The term “system of emissions reduction” could
be read very narrowly, simply to mean technology installed at the facility,
or broadly, to include any policies regulating generators and the electrical
grid in order to reduce carbon emissions.
Obviously, EME Homer does not speak directly to this situation since it
involved a different provision of the statute. However, there are some sig-
nificant parallels. Like the good neighbor provision, section 111(d) calls for
state plans to control emissions. The plans in question seem similar to the
SIPs involved in EME Homer. In the case of climate change, the emissions
in question (like those in EME Homer) cause harm to jurisdictions other
than the emitting state. Both cases involve similar issues regarding how the
total level of emissions cuts should be set by EPA and how EPA can allocate
them among the states.
To the extent that courts accept the analogy between the handling of
cross-border pollution under section 110 plans and carbon emissions under
section 111(d) plans, EME Homer could turn out to be a very helpful prece-
dent for EPA. It stresses EPA’s flexibility and the need for efficient and
equitable regulatory solutions so long as the statutory text can be read to
allow them. It also contains an important affirmation of the Court’s under-
standing of the complexity and difficulty of designing those solutions, and
of its willingness to give EPA flexibility in doing so. The Court also
stressed the need to avoid punishing states that were ahead of the curve and
rewarding laggard states with lower responsibilities, a concern that is rele-
vant in the context of climate change.
EME Homer might also be relevant under another provision calling for
state plans to reduce emissions. Section 115 of the Act155 is triggered by a
152. Id.
153. CAA § 111(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(2).
154. CAA § 111(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1).
155. CAA § 115, 42 U.S.C. § 7415; for discussion of this potential method for address-
ing carbon emissions, see David R. Baake, International Climate Action Without Congress: Does
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finding that United States emissions endanger human health and welfare in
other nations, and that the other nations give this country reciprocal rights
to complain about harm from their pollution.156 Once such a finding is
made, it is deemed to be a finding that the SIPs of the states in question are
inadequate under section 110.157 But this provision is only applicable if the
pollution impacts “a foreign country which the Administrator determines
has given the United States essentially the same rights with respect to the
prevention or control of air pollution occurring in that country as is given
that country by this section.”158
It should be easy to satisfy the endangerment portion of the triggering
conditions in the case of climate change. The exact meaning of the reciproc-
ity requirement is less clear, but assuming it is satisfied, the statute seems to
require plan amendments to “prevent or eliminate the endangerment” re-
ferred to in the triggering requirement.159 Note, however, that the trigger-
ing requirement covers pollution that “causes or contributes” to the
endangerment, much like the good neighbor provision. Because it invokes
the same concept of contribution and requires revision of SIPs, section 115
seems particularly analogous to the good neighbor provision. The implica-
tion of EME Homer seems to be that EPA has broad discretion to set state
reduction budgets, including consideration of costs.
Notably, the Court in EME Homer spoke approvingly of emissions
trading160 as part of EPA’s regulatory approach:
These FIPs [the federal implementation plans issued by EPA]
specified the maximum amount of pollution each in-state pollution
§115 of the Clean Air Act Provide Sufficient Authority?, 44 ENVTL. L. REP . NEWS & ANALYSIS
10562 (2014).
156. CAA § 115(a), (c), 42 U.S.C. § 7415(a), (c).
157. CAA § 115(b), 42 U.S.C. § 114(b). The specific cross-reference is to CAA
§ 110(a)(2)(H)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(H)(ii), which provides that EPA can provide for
revision of state plans under these circumstances:
[E]xcept as provided in paragraph (3)(C) [which deals with certain specific types
of facilities], whenever the Administrator finds on the basis of information availa-
ble to the Administrator that the plan is substantially inadequate to attain the
national ambient air quality standard which it implements or to otherwise comply
with any additional requirements established under this chapter.
CAA § 110(a)(2)(H)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(H)(ii).
158. CAA § 115(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7415(c).
159. CAA § 115(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7415(b).
160. In order to deal with the D.C. Circuit’s objections to the CAIR trading system in
the North Carolina case, EPA had incorporated “assurance” requirements to guarantee that
every upwind state would have to make some significant contribution to downwind attain-
ment. See Seth Jaffe & Adam Kahn, EPA Proposes Rule to Address Interstate Pollution (Jul.
13, 2010), http://www.foleyhoag.com/publications/alerts-and-updates/2010/july/epa-propo
ses-transport-rule-to-address-interstate-air-pollution, for an explanation of this requirement.
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source could emit. Sources below this ceiling could sell unused “al-
locations” to sources that could not reduce emissions to the neces-
sary level as cheaply. This type of “cap and trade” system cuts costs
while still reducing pollution to target levels.161
Although this was dictum, since the legality of the emissions trading system
was not directly before the Court, it augurs well for EPA’s use of carbon
trading under sections 111(d) and 115.162
As important as the problem of interstate pollution may be, it pales in
comparison with the problem of global climate change. In the absence of
congressional action on the subject, EPA’s authority under the Clean Air
Act will remain a key part of any national strategy to address climate
change. To the extent that EME Homer gives EPA discretion to adopt sensi-
ble, cost-efficient measures to address the problem, it will have made a ma-
jor contribution to national policy on this pressing global issue.
CONCLUSION
We have come to the end of a somewhat convoluted journey. To recap
briefly, we have concluded that the Court came to the right answer regard-
ing the two substantive issues in the case: whether the statute required EPA
to make cuts as proportionally as possible between upwind states, and
whether EPA could consider costs in allocating emission cuts. The Court’s
analysis was not entirely satisfactory as to either issue, however. Its discus-
sion of proportionality was a bit off-kilter at times, allowing the dissent to
score some valid points.163 Its analysis of the cost issue inexplicably avoided
mention of an important Supreme Court precedent, which was also (equally
inexplicably) missing from the dissent.164 Nevertheless, the core of the anal-
ysis of both issues was correct.
The key holdings in EME Homer were that strict proportionality was
not required in allocation responsibility for emissions reductions and that
EPA could consider cost in doing so. If there were glitches in the analysis,
this is understandable given the complexity of the issues involved. It is
greatly to the credit of the majority opinion that the Court recognized
EPA’s comparative advantage in dealing with this complexity. By compari-
son, the dissent and the majority in the lower court seemingly failed to
appreciate the difficulty of the problem that Congress had given EPA, mak-
161. EPA v. EME Homer City Generator, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1598 n. 10 (2014)
(citations omitted).
162. For general discussion of market mechanisms such as emissions trading and their
use under the Clean Air Act, see FARBER & CARLSON, supra note 16, at 559-76.
163. See text accompanying supra notes 84 to 102.
164. See text accompanying supra notes 124 to 134.
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ing them all too willing to leap to a seemingly simple answer. Rather than
assuming that agency was off on some tangent of its own, these judges
might have given more thought to the possibility that the agency was doing
the best it could to accomplish a difficult task.
EME Homer is notable for reasons that go beyond its specific holding.
It emphasizes EPA’s discretion in implementing statutes in recondite fac-
tual settings. That should be a useful reminder to lower courts of the need
for a certain degree of judicial modesty in reviewing such complex issues.
The Court’s decision also sheds light on the general issue of EPA’s author-
ity to consider costs in implementing federal environmental laws, though
the Court could have done more to articulate the applicable standard. Still,
the emerging rule seems to be that EPA can consider costs in the absence of
a specific statutory metric. However, when the Clean Air Act does provide
a non-cost metric, there is a presumption against reading in the use of cost
as an additional factor.
Finally, EME Homer also has significant implications for EPA’s ability
to use other provisions in the Clean Air Act to deal with climate change.
Like the good neighbor provision involved in EME Homer, those other pro-
visions involve an EPA-guided planning process for states, and EME Homer
suggests that EPA should have discretion to craft cost-effective, equitable
standards for those plans.
These are undoubtedly significant legal implications. Yet, in our fasci-
nation with the legal issues before the Court, it is important not to lose
track of the immediate practical significance of the ruling. Because of the
Court’s decision, EPA will be able to move forward on measures that will
save thousands of lives and also prevent many other thousands of cases of
serious illnesses.165 To put it most simply: we can all breathe easier as a
result of the Court’s ruling.
165. See text accompanying supra notes 2 to 4.
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